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COMMENTS
BABCOCK V. JACKSON: THE TRANSITION FROM THE LEX
LOCI DELICTI RULE TO THE DOMINANT
CONTACTS APPROACH
In the recent case of Babcock v. Jackson 1 the New York Court of
Appeals refused to apply Ontario's guest statute,2 which would have
barred recovery, even though Ontario was the place where the automobile
accident giving rise to the suit occurred. Babcock is the culmination of a
judicial trend toward the abandonment of the traditional lex loci delicti
principle of choice of tort law, under which the law of the place of injury
determines a plaintiff's right of action in tort. Having finally repudiated the
traditional lex loci delicti principle,3 the court in Babcock adopted a new
approach to choice of tort law, under which the law of the state having
"dominant contacts" with the transaction governs the suit. This comment
will examine the lex loci delicti rule and the judicial transition from it to
the new "dominant contacts" approach enunciated in Babcock, with some
attempt to consider unresolved difficulties in the newer approach to choice
of tort law.
THE

Lex Loci Delicti

RULE

The traditional rule for choice of tort law has been that the lex loci
delicti, the law of the place of the wrong, determines all questions of substantive law in tort suits,4 unless that law is contrary to a strong public
l 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963), 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, reversing 17 App. Div. 2d 694,
230 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1962) (which contained an excellent dissenting opinion by Judge
Halpern); 12 BUFFALO L. REv. 359 (1963). See also Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion
in New York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1, 34-39.
2 ONTARIO REv. STAT. (1960) ch. 172, § 105(2): "[T]he owner or driver of a motor
vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying passengers for com•
pensation, is not liable for any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death
of any person being carried in ••. the motor vehicle."
s The lex loci delicti rule had come under increasing attack from the writers. See, e.g.,
in chronological order, Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws,
33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924); Yntema, The Hombook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37
YALE L.J. 468 (1928); Lorenzen, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 47 L.Q. REv. 483
(1931); Cook, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 202 (1935);
Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 TUL. L. REv.
4, 165 (1944); Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility,
58 HARV. L. REv. 361 (1945); Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REv. 881
(1951); Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of
Laws, IO STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958); Stumberg, "The Place of the Wrong": Torts and the
Conflict of Laws, 34 WASH. L. REv. 388 (1959); Ehrenzweig, .The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in
the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH. L. REv. 637 (1960); Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion
in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. I.
4 REsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 384 (1934): "(I) If a cause of action in tort is
created at the place of wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in other states. (2) If
no cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in
any other state." See generally LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAws § 110 (1959); Goodrich, Tort
Obligations and the Conflict of Laws, 73 U. PA. L. REv. 19 (1924).
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policy of the forum.IS The rule has been associated historically with the
vested rights theory,6 under which rights and obligations defined by the
law of a particular jurisdiction vest in the parties and follow them into
any other jurisdiction where suit may be brought.7 The vested rights theory
presupposes that there is a single jurisdiction in which rights vest, even
though the important aspects of the transaction may have occurred in more
than one jurisdiction.8 The theory consequently requires a jurisdictionselecting rule to determine which law defines the rights which have vested,9
and the lex loci delicti principle has served as this jurisdiction-selecting
rule in suits for torts. It selects the law of the place of injury to govern all
issues that arise. 10
The claimed advantages of the lex loci delicti rule are that it leads to
uniform treatment of a cause of action in all jurisdictions where it might
be litigated, and therefore discourages forum shopping, and also that the
rule is easy to apply and lends predictability and certainty to the conflict of
laws.11 These advantages are not to be discounted, but neither should they
be given undue weight. The lex loci delicti rule leads to uniform treatment
of a cause of action only to the extent that none of the possible forums has
a strong public policy which would require a different result.12 Moreover,
forum shopping is probably not such a major evil that a choice of law
rule should find much justification in its prevention. The lex loci delicti
rule is undoubtedly easy to apply in the great majority of cases, but there
are also many situations where the rule does not dictate a clear result. In
defamation cases, for example, where injury to the plaintiff's reputation
may occur in several states as the result of publication in a single newsIS R.EsTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 4, § 612, "No action can be maintained upon a
cause of action created in another state the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong
public policy of the forum.'' See Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 472, 3 N.E.2d 597, 599
(1936) (public policy defined as "the law of the state, whether found in the Constitution,
the statutes or judicial records''); see generally Paulsen &: Sovern, "Public Policy" in
the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLUM. L. REv. 969 (1956).
6 See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 377-92 (1935); R.EsTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 4,
§§ 377-92; SroMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 8 (3d ed. 1963).
7 Slater v. Mexican Nat'! R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904) (opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes).
"The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained of was subject to no
law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which like other
obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the person be found."
Id. at 126; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (opinion by
Cardozo, J.). "The fundamental public policy is perceived to be that rights lawfully
vested shall be everywhere maintained.'' Id. at 113, 120 N.E. at 202.
s In 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 6, § 378.1, the reporter for the first Restatement,
Conflict of Laws states that: "If, therefore, there was no cause of action created at the
place where the person or thing took harm, or if no cause of action there is proved to
the court, there can be no recovery for tort."
9 See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HAR.v. L. REv. 173, 198
(1933).
10 R.EsTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 4, § 377: "The place of the wrong is in the state
where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.''
11 Cheatham &: Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 959, 969, 977
(1952); Comment, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1497, 1508 (1961).
12 See note 5 supra.
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paper, the law of each of the several states would seem to have equal claim
to being the appljcable law.13 Furthermore, the lex loci delicti rule has
not lent predictability and certainty to conflict of laws to the extent
anticipated. There have been a number of notable instances in which
courts have either attempted to avoid the effect of the rule by straining its
exceptions, or have refused to apply the rule at all. 14 The rule causes
unpredictability to the extent that it provokes such aberrant behavior on
the part of courts seeking to avoid its results.
Perhaps the major vice of the lex loci delicti rule is that it takes no
account of policy considerations, and therefore prefers an obvious to a just
result. The courts that follow this rigid choice of law rule are prevented
from deciding cases with a view to the social desirability of the outcome. 11S
For example, the state of injury may have no connection with the occurrence
other than being the situs of the injury, nor any interest in the outcome
of suit. The forum, on the other hand, may have a legitimate desire to
apply its own law, because of contacts with the occurrence which give the
forum an interest in giving effect to its particular policies. Thus, if a man
in state X writes a letter to an old friend in state Y which contains certain
defamatory remarks about the former's wife, publication and therefore
injury to the wife's reputation occur in state Y. Suppose the law of state X
does not permit a wife to sue her husband in tort, but state Y has no such
prohibition. Under the lex loci delicti rule, the wife could sue her husband
in accord with the law of Y,16 even though no relevant policy consideration
would favor this result. State Y's policy, if any, relates only to spouses
residing within state Y,17 and yet state X's policy, which is directly concerned with the parties in the case,18 is considered to have no importance.
Strangely enough, if the old friend omits to open the letter until he sets
foot in state X, the law of X governs instead because state X rather than
Y is the lex loci delicti. In this situation, however, the choice of the law of
state X as the governing law is made regardless of whether state X has an
See Dale System v. Time, 116 F. Supp. 527, 530 (D. Conn. 1953).
See the cases discussed in text accompanying notes 19-57 infra.
Yntema, supra note 3, at 482-83. "The vice of the vested rights theory is that it
affects to decide concrete cases upon generalities which do not state the practical considerations involved and so it must perforce obscure the issue." Id. at 482-83.
16 REsTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 4, § 377, Rule 5, at 457 concludes that in speaking
of harm to reputation, the place of the wrong is where the defamatory statement is
communicated.
17 It should also be noted that certain additional problems exist, the first being whether
the absence of a law in state Y providing for interspousal immunity implies the existence
of any affirmative policy on the question. Second, there is a problem whether the policy,
if any, favoring recovery is intended to benefit all plaintiffs suing in state Y or only
plaintiffs residing in state Y. See note 81 infra. In the interspousal immunity context,
however, there is no reason to suppose that state Y would have any particular concern
one way or another whether nonresident plaintiffs could sue their spouses.
18 Whether the policy of state X to grant interspousal immunity is designed to prevent
disruptions in the marital relationship, or to prevent collusion against insurers, that
policy is relevant to the case because the parties, and probably their insurers, have their
domicils in state X. See note 80 infra.
13
14
15
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actual interest in giving effect to its policy of interspousal immunity. It is
clear that the results of such a mechanical rule can be capricious indeed.
DOCTRINE IN TRANSITION

Faced with the occasionally inequitable results of the lex loci delicti
rule, courts in recent years have not always applied the rule in a purely
mechanical way. On the contrary, certain recent opinions have demonstrated
an increasing dissatisfaction with the rule, which amounts to a gradual
recognition of a need for change in the law. These cases, which may have
seemed mere aberrations at the time of their decision, now appear to stand
together as a trend toward the outright rejection of the rule, which finally
occurred in Babcock v. Jackson.
In Gordon v. Parker19 Massachusetts applied its own law to permit an
action for alienation of affections against a Massachusetts doinicilary even
though Pennsylvania, the state of matrimonial domicil and therefore
presumably also the state of injury, had abolished civil actions for alienation of affections. Judge Wyzanski referred in passing to the first Restatement's rule that the forum "generally applies the law of the state where an
alleged wrong has occurred in deciding whether a person has sustained a
legal injury." 20 He proceeded almost immediately, however, to analyze the
relative interests of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania in the suit, and
concluded that Massachusetts' interest in limiting misconduct within her
own borders was superior to any interest Pennsylvania might have had in
refusing to give a remedy. Implicit in the decision was a rejection of the
notions that a tort occurs where injury finally results, and that the law of
the place of injury must necessarily govern the suit. However, the holding
was carefully restricted to the facts of the case; there was no direct criticism
of the lex loci delicti rule, but only an intimation that it was not relevant
in the particular situation.21
In Dale System v. Time,22 a federal district court in Connecticut concluded that the law of the place of plaintiff's domicil should apply to a
libel action where publication had occurred in numerous states.23 This
holding relieved the court of having to locate a particular state of injury
whose law would govern the suit, a problem under the lex loci delicti rule
which, in this sort of situation, would have inevitably proved embarrassing.
The court insisted that its holding was consistent with the lex loci delicti
concept, although the effect of the holding was clearly to allow the forum
to apply its own law where, as the domicil of the plaintiff, it had a sig83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949), 62 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1065 (1949).
83 F. Supp. at 41.
Id. at 42. A further advantage of the court's approach in Gordon was that it avoided
the problem raised by the le" lod delicti rule of having to decide where the injury
occurred.
22 116 F. Supp. 527 (D. Conn. 1953), 102 U. PA. L. REv. 801 (1954).
2a 116 F. Supp. at 530.
10
20
21
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nificant contact with the case and ·therefore an interest in promoting
recovery. In a situation where the lex loci delicti rule could not dictate a
clear result because of the plurality of states of injury, the court adopted
a rule based on contacts rather than caprice.
In Grant v. McAuliffe2 4 the Supreme Court of California concluded
that California law should govern the question of survival of a tort action
where Arizona, the place of the injury, did not permit tort actions to be
brought after the defendant's death. All parties in the case were residents
of California, and the estate of the deceased tort-feasor was also being
administered in California. Justice Traynor acknowledged that lex loci
delicti should govern unless the question of survival was procedural. He
nonetheless refused to apply the lex loci delicti rule on the grounds that
(1) survival of causes of action is a procedural question to be governed by
the law of the forum25 and (2) the survival of causes of action is a question
of the administration of decedent's estates, and thus to be governed by the
law of the defendant's domicil.26 Both rationales pointed to application
of California law in the Grant case. Justice Traynor was apparently so
impressed by the contacts of California with the case that he sought justifications for applying California law. He probably would not have wished
Arizona law to govern the question if Arizona had been the forum, even
though this would have been the effect of his holding that survival of a
cause of action is a procedural matter to be governed by the law of the
forum. Moreover, in order to characterize the question as procedural, Justice
Traynor was required to rely upon cases decided before the 1934 endorsement of the lex loci delicti rule by the first Restatement, instead of looking
to the more recent cases which had characterized the issue as substantive.27
His characterization of the question as procedural appears to have been a
concession to the lex loci delicti rule, the effect of which the court was trying to avoid in a case where the forum had the most significant contacts
with the matter at issue.28 The fact that the court also felt the need to
characterize the question as one of administration of decedent's estates,
rather than one of tort liability, indicates that the court may have been
dissatisfied with its characterization of the issue as procedural. It is probable that the motive for both characterizations was to reach a preferred
result in the particular case without directly challenging the general rule
of lex loci delicti.29
24 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); see Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication
Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, IO STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958).
25 41 Cal. 2d at 866,264 P.2d at 949.
26 Ibid.
21 Id. at 863, 264 P.2d at 947.
28 See Cavers, A Critique.of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HAAv. L. REv. 173, 185-86
(1933), where the author included the procedural exception in his list of avenues of escape
for courts wishing to do justice rather than to follow mechanical choice-of-law rules.
29 This conclusion finds support in a later law review article in which Judge
Traynor commented on his own opinion in the Grant v. McAulifje case. Traynor, Is This
Conflict Really Necessary'!, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657, 670 n.35 (1959): "It may not be amiss
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Further dissatisfaction with the lex loci delicti rule and a preference for
a choice of law rule based on contacts was expressed in dictum in Walt on
v. Arabian American Oil Co.so Judge Frank remarked that lex loci delicti
should not apply where a tort is committed in an uncivilized country or
in one having no law that civilized countries would recognize as adequate.
In such cases, the courts should apply the substantive law of the country
which is most closely connected with the parties and their conduct.s1 Invocation of the public policy exception to the lex loci delicti rule would
also have prevented application of a barbarous law without departing
from the framework of the lex loci delicti rule. In this kind of situation,
however, Judge Frank apparently preferred a choice of law methodology
based on contacts.
In Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel 32 a Minnesota court demonstrated a much
stronger impatience with the lex loci delicti rule, and openly refused to
apply it at all in a case where Wisconsin, as the place of the tort, had had
no connection with the occurrence other than being the situs of the injury,
and no particular interest in the outcome of suit. Both parties were residents of Minnesota, and the defendant had violated the Minnesota dramshop statute by selling liquor to an intoxicated Minnesota resident whose
driving later injured the plaintiff in Wisconsin. The court recognized that
Minnesota's interests "in admonishing a liquor dealer whose violation of
its statutes was a cause of such injuries; and in providing for the injured
party a remedy therefor" would become ineffective if Wisconsin law were
applied. 33 The court concluded that the lex loci delicti rule "should not
be held applicable in fact situations such as the present to bring about
the result described and that a determination to the opposite effect would
be more in conformity with the principles of equity and justice." 34 It is
noteworthy that there was no attempt in Schmidt to rationalize objection
to the lex loci delicti rule under the public policy exception. Moreover,
the court did not limit its objection to the operation of the rule in the
particular case. The implication was rather that the lex loci delicti rule
should not be applied in any case where the result would not be in conformity with principles of equity and justice; the rule was only to be followed if a judicial weighing of interests suggested that application of the
lex loci delicti would lead to a just result.35 Thus the court openly rejected
the very idea of a mechanical rule for choice of law. Actual selection of
to add that although the opinion is my own, I do not regard it as ideally articulated,
developed as it had to be against the brooding background of a petrified forest. Yet I
would make no more apology for it than that in reaching a rational result it was less
deft than it might have been to quit itself of the familiar speech of choice of law."

so 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956).
s1 Id. at 545.
32

249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957), 71 HARv. L. REv. 1351 (1958).

ss 249 Minn. at 380, 82 N.W.2d at 368.
Si
35

Ibid.
Ibid.
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law was to be made by a weighing of interests, and the only function of the
lex loci delicti rule was to rationalize the result in cases where the place
of injury also had the strongest interest in the suit. Retained in such an
emasculated form, the rule might better have been rejected altogether.
In Haumschild v. Continental Gas. Co.36 the court expressed a different
sort of dissatisfaction with the operation of the lex loci delicti rule in a
situation involving interspousal immunity from tort liability. Without
hearing argument by counsel on the point, the court chose on its own
motion to overrule previous cases which had held that the law of the place
of the wrong determines whether spouses could sue each other in tort.81
The Wisconsin court held that, where the spouses resided in Wisconsin, a
wife was permitted under Wisconsin law to sue her husband for injuries
resulting from an accident in California. The rationale of the holding was
that the question of interspousal immunity was one of family law to be
governed by the law of the domicil of the parties, and not a question of
tort law to be governed by the lex loci delicti. 38 The court clearly rejected
the lex loci delicti rule in the particular type of case, with the further comment that "it must be recognized that, in the field of conflict of laws,
absolutes should not be made the goal at the sacrifice of progress in furtherance of sound public policy."39 The concurrence suggested an alternative
method by which the same result could have been reached in the particular
case without expressly overruling cases adhering to the lex loci delicti rule.40
However, the court in Haumschild, like the court in Grant v. McAulifje,
preferred to reclassify the problem rather than permit the lex loci delicti
rule to continue to control the kind of case in issue. In Haumschild, as in
Schmidt, the court was no longer content to avoid the effect of the lex
loci delicti rule in a particular case, but was also willing to challenge the
applicability of the rule itself to a whole category of cases. Moreover, the
distinct implication of both opinions was that the lex loci delicti rule was
generally unsatisfactory because it failed to take account of relevant policy
considerations.
In the famous case of Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines41 the New York
Court of Appeals made a special effort to undermine the lex loci delicti
rule, although without condemning it directly. The administrator of a
36 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959), 73 HAR.v. L. REv. 785 (1960). See Ford, Interspousal Immunity for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason
Yersus the Restatement, 15 U. Prrr. L. REv. 397 (1954).
37 E.g., Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931).
38 Haumscbild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 137, 95 N.W.2d 814, 818 (1959).
39 Id. at 138, 95 N.W .2d at 818.
40 Id. at 143, 95 N.W.2d at 821. The dissent would have applied California law, which
classifies immunity as a matter of status to be determined by the law of the domicil of
the parties.
41 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). This case has been noted in
many law reviews, including 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 1497 (1961); 46 CORNELL L.Q. 637 (1961);
49 GEO. L.J. 768 (1961); 74 HARV. L. REv. 1652 (1961); 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 620 (1961); 28
U. Cm. L. REv. 733 (1961); 47 VA. L. REv. 692 (1961). See also Currie, supra note I, at 1-22.
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New York decedent brought an action in New York against a common
carrier under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute, which limited
recovery to 15,000 dollars. Massachusetts was the place of the plane crash
which killed Mr. Kilberg, and also the state of the defendant's incorporation. It was held that the plaintiff could recover damages under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute without regard to the 15,000-dollar limit
on recovery. Like the court in the Haumschild case, the court in Kilberg
was in no way required to take a position challenging the traditional
operation of the lex loci delicti rule, for the question of the applicability
of the Massachusetts damage limitation had not even been argued on appeal.42 Nevertheless, the court considered the question sua sponte and
rationalized its decision that the damage limitation did not apply by resorting to the procedural and public policy exceptions to the rule.43 It is notable
that the court was willing to fly in the face of authority that the measure
of damages was a question of substantive law,44 without even being asked
to do so. Moreover, the court practically confessed that its classification of
the question as procedural was merely a device to protect the interests of
New York citizens, "without doing violence to the accepted pattern of
conflict of laws rules." 45 In this regard the position of the court in Kilberg
is most closely comparable to the opinion in Grant v. McAuliffe. In both
cases, the courts invoked the procedural exception to avoid the normal
effect of the lex loci delicti rule in situations where that law would fail
to give adequate compensation to citizens of the forum.
The procedural exception was inappropriately invoked in Kilberg. The
implicit assumption underlying the procedural exception would seem to
be that merely procedural rules will not affect the substantive rights which
vest in the plaintiff, and that, for the sake of convenience, the court may
therefore apply forum law to questions of procedure rather than bothering
to familiarize itself with the law of another jurisdiction.46 However, in
Kilberg the holding that a damage limitation was procedural clearly expanded the plaintiff's right to recovery, and the court would hardly have
42 9 N.Y.2d at 37, 172 N.E.2d at 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 134 (1961).

Id. at 41-42, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137. It should be noted that if the
lex loci delicti rule is stated by saying that the law of the place of injury governs only
all questions of substantive law in tort suits, then the so-called procedural exception is
not really an exception but merely a corollary.
44 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914); Northern Pac. R.R. v.
Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1894); LEFLAR, op. cit. supra note 4, § 65.
45 9 N.Y.2d at 39, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
46 The customary explanation of the procedural exception speaks principally in terms
of inconvenience to the forum. For example, in REsrATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 701
it is said that:
"Such [procedural] limitation excludes those phases of the case which make administration of foreign law by the local tribunal impractical, inconvenient, or violative
of local policy. In these instances, the local rules at the forum are applied and are
classified as matters of procedure."
The implicit assumption th:it procedural determinations do not affect substantive rights
is clearly erroneous, as the result in Kilberg indicates.
43
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been inconvenienced by limiting recovery. The justifications for invoking
the procedural exception were therefore not present. The court chose, however, not to follow Supreme Court cases which had classified the question
of damage limitations as a substantive matter.47 Moreover, the court's
holding that damage limitations are procedural was misdirected if the real
desire of the court was merely to compensate New York citizens. If suit
were to be brough,t in Massachusetts by a New York plaintiff on the basis
of the New York wrongful death statute, the Massachusetts court, if it
chose to follow the Kilberg rationale, would limit the recovery available
to the New York citizen because the measure of damages would be a procedural matter to be governed by the law of Massachusetts. The court itself appeared to recognize the ineptness of its holding, and therefore chose
to "treat the measure of damages in this case as being a procedural or
remedial question.'' 48 The court's willingness to call a question procedural
because the interests of citizens of the forum might thereby be promoted
'indicated an unashamedly manipulative attitude toward the lex loci delicti
rule which is not in keeping with the rule's objectives of uniformity and
predictability of result.
The dominant rationale for the holding in Kilberg was that the damage
limitation of the Massachusetts statute should not be enforced because it
was contrary to the strong public policy of the forum, which favored unlimited recovery.49 This rationale was also too broad if the motive of the
court was only to compensate New York citizens, for a New York court
would be obliged under this rationale to give unlimited recovery to nonresident plaintiffs as well. The court, however, was apparently willing to
give effect to this public policy only when New York had an interest in
the application of that policy. This interest arose in Kilberg through the
contact of New York with the case, as the state where the plaintiff's intestate resided. Thus the court stated, "For our courts to be limited by this
damage ceiling (at least as to our own domiciliaries) is so completely contrary to our public policy that we should refuse to apply that part of the
Massachusetts law."50 It thus seems clear that the New York court was using
the public policy exception as a device to allow the forum to apply its own
law where its contacts with the parties gave the forum a substantial interest. 51
The difficulties in Kilberg could be said to stem from the fact that the
court did not go far enough in rejecting the lex loci delicti rule. For example, if the court had frankly admitted that it preferred to apply the
47 Slater v. Mexican Nat'! R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904); Northern Pac. R.R. v.
Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1894).
48 9 N.Y.2d at 42, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137. (Emphasis added.) The procedural characterization was subsequently withdrawn in Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392,
183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962).
49 9 N.Y.2d at 40, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
50 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
51 See Paulsen &: Sovern, supra note 5, at 1016.
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forum law where the forum's contacts with the case seemed more significant,
then the court might have applied the entire New York wrongful death
statute,152 and the court would not have had to strain exceptions to the
lex loci delicti rule to reach the desired result.113 All the features of the
Kilberg opinion which seem objectionable from the point of view of vested
rights thinkers should rather be seen as symptoms of a profound dissatisfaction with the "accepted pattern of conflict of laws rules."
In Pearson v. Northeast Airlines54 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit stated that the result in Kilberg did not violate the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution because "a state with substantial ties to a
transaction in dispute has a legitimate constitutional interest in the application of its own rules of law."155 The court was of the opinion that "by
weighing the contacts of various states with the transaction, New York may,
without interfering with the Constitution, shape its rules controlling the
litigation."1> 6 Thus, if the New York court was able reasonably to find that
its contacts with the dispute were substantial, the court was constitutionally
free to apply its own state law whether or not it justified its decision in
terms of the public policy exception to the lex loci delicti rule. Moreover,
the court in Pearson specifically rejected the notion that adherence to
the lex loci delicti rule was a test of the constitutionality of a state's choice
of law.157 The opinion thereby left the door open for outright rejection of
the rule in the subsequent case of Babcock v. Jackson.
In sum, the cases from Gordon to Pearson represent an increasing impatience with the lex loci delicti rule, a dissatisfaction which showed itself
in a variety of ways. The Dale System and Grant cases strained to make
their conclusions seem consistent with the lex loci delicti rule. The later
Schmidt opinion, on the other hand, openly declared that its resolution
152 N.Y. DECED. Esr. LAw § 130. In order to apply the New York wrongful death statute
in the Kilberg situation, however, the court would have had to overrule authority holding
that the statute applies only to a wrongful death occurring in New York. Cooper v.
American Airlines, 149 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1945).
1>3 A further difficulty in Kilberg arose from the court's willingness to enforce a
foreign statutory right of action without giving effect to a damage limitation which WllJ1
arguably part of that very right. In Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547
(1914), Mr. Justice Holmes concluded that a statute which creates a cause of action for
death by a wrongful act may set a limit to the amount which may be recovered; such
a limitation is part of the right and is governed by the lex loci delicti. Contra, Wooden
v. Western N.Y. &: P.R.R., 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050 (1891). In any event, if the court had
chosen to apply the New York wrongful death statute, the problem of whether a damage
limitation was part of the definition of the right of recovery would have been avoided,
because New York's statute has no damage limitation. N.Y. DECED. Esr. LAw § 130.
154 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 133 (1963).
!>IS 309 F.2d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1962). In Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962),
it was said that: "Where more than one State has sufficiently substantial contact with the
activity in question, the forum State, by analysis of the interests possessed by the States
involved, could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law of one or another
state having such an interest in the multistate activity." See Currie, The Constitution and
Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI L. REv. 9 (1958).
1>0 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553, 561 (2d Cir. 1962).
57 Id. at 557.
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was based entirely on considerations the rule ignored. While Gordon v.
Parker refused to find that the rule had any relevance to its own particular
case, the court in Schmidt and Haumschild concluded that the rule had
no relevance to whole categories of cases. The Grant and Kilberg cases
relied on very weak authority to invoke the procedural exception to the
rule, and Haumschild overruled previous decisions which held that the rule
applied. While Gordon and Dale System admitted no dissatisfaction with
the workings of the rule, Haumschild and Kilberg called the rule in
question without even being asked to do so. Schmidt simply refused to
apply the rule to the case, while Dale, Grant, and Haumschild formulated
specific new choice of law rules which were at least major qualifications of,
if not exceptions to, the lex loci delicti rule. And, in Kilberg, the court
confessed openly that it was rationalizing in order to avoid the normal
effect of the rule. In all the cases the courts demonstrated a desire not to
be bound by a mechanical rule which failed to accommodate the equities
of the parties to relevant policies of the states. The courts apparently preferred to rely on contacts as a basis for choosing the applicable law.
THE NEW .APPROACH AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

In Babcock v. ]ackson 58 the New York Court of Appeals became the first
court to repudiate completely both the old vested rights doctrine and the
lex loci delicti rule for choice of tort Iaw.59 The court conceded that
the traditional lex loci delicti choice of law rule could claim the advantages
of certainty, predictability, and ease of application.110 The court nevertheless discarded the rule because it "ignores the interest which jurisdictions
other than that where the tort occurred may have in the resolution of
particular issues" 61 and therefore leads to "unjust and anomalous results." 62
In justifying its refusal to apply the lex loci delicti rule, the court contended that "it is New York, the place where the parties resided, where
their guest-host relationship arose and where the trip began and was to
end, rather than Ontario, the place of the fortuitous occurrence of the
accident, which has the dominant contacts and superior claim for application of its law.'' 63 The court concluded that disposition of a particular
issue in a tort suit must turn on the law of the jurisdiction which has the
strongest interest in the resolution of that issue.64
58 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). The Babcock case has been
noted in numerous law reviews, including 28 .ALBANY L. REv. 128 (1964); 13 AM. U.L. REV.
158 (1963); 30 BROOKLYN L. REV. 107 (1963); 32 FORDHAM L. REv. 158 (1963); 77 HARV.
L. REv. 355 (1963); 79 L.Q. Rzy. 484 (1963); 47 MARQ. L. REv. 255 (1963); 15 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 202 (1963); 49 VA. L. REv. 1362 (1963). See Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a
Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1963).
59 See id. at 1229.
60 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746-47
(1963).
61
62
68
64

Ibid.
Id. at 479, 191 N.E.2d at 282, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284-85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
Id. at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285,240 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
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The new dominant contacts approach in Babcock differs from the old
lex loci delicti rule in two major respects. The Babcock approach looks
to more than the single contact of injury in selecting the governing law
and, further, the Babcock approach may look to more than one jurisdiction
to supply the governing law. The new dominant contacts choice of law
principle is not a jurisdiction-selecting rule designed to designate the law
-0f a single state to govern all aspects of a tort claim. Instead, the law which
will govern each issue arising out of the claim is determined by deciding
which state has the dominant contacts with the case relevant to that particular issue. Thus, while the court in Babcock was willing to let Ontario
law govern the issue of standard of care, because the accident occurred on
an Ontario highway, the court felt that New York law should govern the
issue of a host's liability to his guest, since the dominant contacts of the
parties and their trip were with New York. The dominant contacts choice
of law principle in Babcock is in effect a jurisdiction-selecting rule for
each issue in the case, which considers more than the single contact of
injury in choosing the governing law for each issue. In concluding that
different issues in a case may be governed by the laws of different jurisdictions, Babcock is the first case to endorse the actual result in the previous Kilberg decision, which established wrongful death liability under
Massachusetts law and unlimited recovery under the law of New York.
In announcing the new approach, the court in Babcock noted with
approval 65 the most recent draft of the Restatement (Second), Conflict of
Laws,66 which reads, "The local law of the state which has the .most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties determines
their rights and liabilities in tort." 67 The new Restatement suggests in
section 379 that in determining the state with the most significant relationship the courts are to consider four contacts: the place of injury, the place
of conduct, the place of domicil of the parties, and the place of the
relationships, if any, between the parties. The Babcock dominant contacts
approach and the Restatement significant relationship principle are similar
in that both look to more than one contact in selecting the governing law.
However, the two approaches differ in that the principle advocated by the
second Restatement, like the old lex loci delicti rule of the first Restatement,68 serves as a jurisdiction-selecting rule to choose the law of one state
to govern all aspects of the case. Under the view of the second Restatement, a court faced with the Babcock fact situation would have to
Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 283-84, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
67 Id. at § 379. See Comment, 51 CAL. L. REv. 762, 772 (1963). This comment suggests
that the significant relationship test of the Restatement (Second) is unworkable because
it fails to evaluate criteria by which significance is to be determined, and offers no
assistance to a court faced with two competing rules based on diametrically opposed
policies.
68 See note 4 supra. See also Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47
HARV. L. REv. 173, 178 (1933).
65
66
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apply the law of one jurisdiction to both the issues of standard of care
and host's liability to his guest, on the assumption that the law of the
state with the "most significant relationship" to the case as a whole is also
the most appropriate law to govern each issue in the case. The Babcock
approach does not make this assumption, and therefore does not have to
find a reasonable basis for selecting the law of one state to govern an entire
case. The court in Babcock is probably correct in saying that "there is no
reason why all issues arising out of a tort claim must be resolved by
reference to the law of the same jurisdiction," 69 and, if so, the Babcock
approach avoids an assumption which makes choice of law under the
second Restatement view unnecessarily difficult. The Babcock approach
does not require determination of which state has "the most significant
relationship with the occurrence and with the parties" when one issue concerns the occurrence alone, and another issue the parties alone.
A further advantage of the Babcock approach is that it permits courts
not wishing to apply the law of one jurisdiction to every issue to avoid
reclassifying certain problems simply to escape the usual rule for choice of
tort law. For example, in the Haumschild fact situation a court adopting
the Babcock approach would not have to reclassify the question of interspousal immunity as one of family law rather than tort law in order
to apply the law of the parties' domicil. The new approach would allow
the court to say that the law of the parties' domicil should govern the
question of interspousal immunity because the place of domicil has the
dominant contacts with this particular issue in the case. The desired result
would thereby be reached within the framework of a choice of tort law rule,
and not by avoiding such a rule. Similarly, in the Grant v. McAuliffe situation the law of the place of the administration of the decedent's estate
would be said to govern the question of survival of a tort action because
that jurisdiction has the dominant contacts with the issue of survival. In
this fashion, the Babcock approach would have provided a more satisfactory
rationale for the decisions of most of the pre-Babcock cases discussed above.
Despite the fact that the Babcock approach has clear advantages over
the views of both Restatements, it nevertheless raises difficult problems. If
Babcock merely stands for the proposition that the law of the state having
dominant contacts with the particular issue will govern that issue, it gives
little direction to courts which must decide what contacts are dominant in
a particular case. The ambiguity in the notion of dominant contacts can
be at least partially clarified, however, by assuming that apparent contacts
of a state with the matter in issue become significant at all only insofar as
they give that state an interest in the application of its own policies to the
dispute. 70 Under this analysis, a contact is significant only to the extent
69 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 484, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 752
(1963).
70 See Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE
L.J. 171, 178: "2. When it is suggested that the rule of a foreign state should furnish
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that it makes some state policy relevant to the resolution of the issue. For
example, in Babcock, New York had a policy of requiring the driver of an
automobile to compensate his guest for injuries caused by the driver's
negligence,71 and this policy was made relevant to the liability issue in
Babcock by the fact that New York was the state of domicil of both parties
and also the state where their guest-host relationship arose. 72 The policy
of compensating the guest made these contacts significant because the
contacts made the policy relevant. On the other hand, Ontario's policy
concerning the host's liability was not relevant to the issue because Ontario
had no connection with the parties or their relationship. 73 The policy behind the Ontario guest statute was to protect Ontario insurers against
collusion,74 but this policy was irrelevant to the dispute, because the host
did not have an Ontario insurer. The absence of any Ontario contact with
this issue in the case meant that Ontario had no interest in applying its
own policy, and that therefore the New York policy should govern.
I£ signifiant contacts give a state an interest in applying its own policies
to a dispute, then the state with dominant contacts will have the strongest
interest in resolving the issue in its own way. However, the question remains
as to what makes contacts dominant in situations where more than one state
has significant contacts and therefore conflicting interests arise. For example, in the Kilberg situation, Massachusetts as the domicil of the defendant had an interest in applying its policy of limiting recovery, but New
York as the domicil of the plaintiff's intestate had an interest in applying
its policy of unlimited recovery. 75 Likewise, in Babcock, i£ the host had had
an Ontario insurer, both Ontario and New York would have had significant
contacts with the issue of guest-host liability. It is not immediately obvious
why the contacts of one state should be considered to predominate over
those of another. Any answer to this question will depend upon whether
courts adopt a quantitative or a qualitative approach, that is, whether
courts will merely count contacts or will evaluate them according to their
individual significance.
the rule of decision, the court should, first of all, determine the governmental policy
expressed in the law of the forum. It should then inquire whether the relation of the
forum to the case is such as to provide a legitimate basis for the assertion of an interest
in the application of that policy•••• 3. If necessary, the court should similarly determine
the policy expressed by the foreign law, and whether the foreign state has an interest
in the application of its policy."
71 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750
(1963).
72 Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284,240 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
73 On the other hand, it could be argued that the question in Babcock of whether to
apply Ontario's guest statute was a question of the standard of care to be demanded of
the host. Under this analysis, a policy of Ontario would be made relevant to the dispute
by Ontario's contact with the case as the scene of the accident, since even the court in
Babcock admitted that the issue of standard of care should be governed by Ontario law.
Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51.
74 Survey of Canadian Legislation, 1 U. TORONTO L.J. 358, 366 (1936).
75 Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1, 16.
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If courts adopt a quantitative approach, then the law of the state with
the greatest number of significant contacts with the issue will govern.
However, a "dominant contacts" test based on the mere number of significant contacts does not solve the problems of conflicting interests which
arise when two or more states each have an equal number of significant
contacts. In such cases, courts would be tempted to find other contacts of
one of the states, and count them as significant without a careful evaluation
of their individual importance, in order to reach or rationalize a result.
For example, the court in Babcock listed the circumstances that the trip
during which the injury occurred began and was to end in New York as
significant contacts of New York with the dispute, 76 although these contacts
would seem to have in themselves no special relevance to New York's compensatory and admonitory polices underlying the host's liability to his
guest. Moreover, the court counted the occurrence of the tort in Ontario
as only one contact,77 although strictly speaking Ontario was both the place
of the defendant's wrongful conduct and the place of the resulting harm.
The court apparently wanted to be sure that New York's contacts would
outnumber those of Ontario. Implicit in the listing of contacts in Babcock
is the suggestion, whether consciously intended _or not, that the state with
dominant contacts is merely the state with the greatest number of contacts.
A quantitative appr_oach of this sort would seem to encourage excessive
concern with a mere listing of contacts, without corresponding analysis of
their relative significance to the matter in issue.78 As a result, a quantitative
approach would probably not give the courts sufficient guidance in coming
to a conclusion in cases where two or more states each have significant contacts with the matter in dispute. The courts in these cases would most likely
count contacts so as to rationalize a result already determined in some other
way
A qualitative approach, however, would probably give the courts no
further guidance where two or more states each had significant contacts
with a matter in dispute. The underlying policy conflicts would still require
the courts to make a choice and rationalize it by saying that the state whose
law was chosen had the most significant contact with the matter in dispute.
For example, in Kilberg, a conclusion that New York had the more significant contacts because it was the domicil of the plaintiff's intestate, would
not have been a basis for decision but only a justification for the choice of
law. The same preference for New York's compensatory policy which
would have led the court to choose New York law would also have been
the motive for calling New York's contacts more significant than those of
Massachusetts.
76 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 483, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 751
(1963).
77 Ibid.
78 See Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,
63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1212, 1248 (1963) (comment by Professor Leflar rejects quantitative
approach).
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The dominant contacts test enables courts to find significant contacts as
the basis for choosing applicable law. However, the test becomes merely a
rationalization once it has been determined that more than one state has
significant contacts with the dispute. When a choice must be made as to
which state has the dominant contacts, the courts are left with no satisfactory means of determining which contacts are more significant than others,
regardless of whether the courts adopt a quantitative or qualitative approach. The concern of the courts at this point must be not with contacts
themselves but rather with the policies which made these contacts significant in the first place. A preference for one policy over another in
situations like Kilberg must be determined in some other way than evaluation of contacts, since contacts can only make policies relevant, but not
controlling. This is not to say that a contacts test can never itself dictate
a result. In cases where only one state has significant contacts, the dominant
contacts test would naturally select the law of that state to govern the issue.
But where two jurisdictions both have an unquestioned interest based on
contacts in giving effect to their own policies, the choice of law must depend on the court's own decision as to which policy it prefers, with no help
from the dominant contacts choice of law principle.
Before a court can resolve a policy conflict, however, it must discover
what policies underlie the potentially applicable laws, and also define the
scope of those policies. In many instances, laws may be merely arbitrary
rules for solving problems, without any particular policy justification behind them. 78 Furthermore, even if a law in question is intended to effectuate
a policy, its legislative history will often be so inconclusive and judicial
interpretations so sparse or diverse that the underlying policy can not be
articulated clearly.80 Moreover, it may not be clear whether a policy, once
discovered, is intended to be unlimited in its application or restricted to
the domiciliaries of the particular state.81 The Babcock approach forces
courts to consider these problems in situations where several states apparently have significant contacts with the dispute.
In fact, the dominant contacts principle of the Babcock case is not really
a choice of law rule at all, but rather an approach to the problem which
has neither the advantages nor disadvantages of a rule. The new approach
permits the courts to consider the contacts of states with an issue, as a prelude to deciding which relevant policies should be given effect. The results
are not dictated, and the decision may be difficult. Therefore the advan70 Professor Max Rheinstein of the University of Chicago Law School made this point
during a critique of the Cooley Lectures held at The University of Michigan Law School
on Jan. 29, 1964.
80 For example, in regard to statutes granting interspousal immunity from tort suits,
the policy may be to prevent a disruption of the marriage relationship, to prevent
collusion by the spouses against their insurer, or to prevent unwitting participation by
the court in possible fraud.
81 For example, in Kilberg, it is uncertain whether the policy of the New York Constitution allowing unlimited recovery for wrongful death is intended to benefit all plaintiffs suing in New York courts, or only those plaintiffs who happen to reside in New York.
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tages of certainty, predictability, and ease of application which a general
rule would afford are undoubtedly lost. The new approach, however, provides a framework for decision in which the equities of the parties and the
policies of the states are sure to be considered. The language of the new
approach may prove in true conflict situations to be no more than a means
by which to rationalize decisions, rather than the actual grounds of decision. But at least the courts, before reaching their results, will have had to examine many relevant considerations necessarily ignored_by a mechanical rule.
The new approach in effect places choice of tort law in the judge's discretion in complex cases where several states have a legitimate interest, based
on contacts, in giving effect to their policies.82 The new approach therefore allows courts to avoid the unsatisfying results which sometimes occurred under the old lex loci delicti rule. However, the new approach will
prove itself preferable to the old rule only if the courts are willing to
demonstrate the judicial sophistication, precision, and impartiality. it
requires.
Cases of true policy conflict will probably be rare. 88 Most cases can
probably be resolved by a recognition that the policy of one jurisdiction
is not relevant to the particular issue. For example, in Gordon v. Parker
Pennsylvania as the place of the matrimonial domicil probably had no
policy in favor of preventing recovery for alienation of affections outside
of Pennsylvania. In cases of true conflict, a court might choose one policy
over another on the basis of the relative strength with which the policy
is asserted in the law of each state. For example, the court in Kilberg
might have been justified in preferring the New York policy of unlimited
recovery for wrongful death because this policy was articulated in the
New York Constitution, whereas the Massachusetts policy of limited
recovery was merely found in a statute. Likewise, if one competing policy
finds support in a long line of precedent, it might well be preferred over
another policy which is enunciated in only a handful of cases. In true
conflict cases where the relative strength of policy assertion is about equal,
a court might look to the expectations of the parties as to which law would
govern. It is true that the parties' expectations are not so great a factor in
tort .as in contract law, because the parties probably did not anticipate that
a tort would occur. Nevertheless, if there had been a true conflict of policy
in Babcock, £or example, the court might have been justified in applying
New York rather than Ontario law because this was the law the parties
82 See Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 78, at 1251. Professor Leflar feels
the Babcock approach leaves room for discretion in choice of law. Similarly, REsTATEMENT
(SECOND), CONFLICT OF LA.ws, § 379a, comment e, 18, 19 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963), allows
judicial discretion in choice of tort law by permitting application of "the local law of a
state which is not the place of conduct and injury in a situation where application of the
local law of the state of conduct and injury would lead to a result which the court
believes to be unjust."
83 This will be true in part because laws often are merely arbitrary rules for handling
problems, without any basis in particular policies. See note 79 supra.
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would probably have expected to govern their guest-host relation if they
had considered the matter at all.
Since the Babcock dominant contacts approach does not itself resolve
cases of true policy conflict, courts £acing such conflicts may need guidelines for the exercise of discretion such as those suggested above in order
to arrive at decisions to be rationalized in terms of dominant contacts.84
Professor Cavers of Harvard has suggested in his recent Cooley Lectures
given at Michigan Law School that there is a need for "principles of
preference" to help judges £aced with true policy confl.icts.85 Perhaps such
principles, if there is truly a need for them, would best be formulated by
the judges themselves, who have been enabled by the new Babcock approach
to announce more candidly than before the actual reasons for their decisions.
Arthur M. Sherwood

84 Alternative guidelines have been proposed by Professors Currie and Ehrenzweig.
See Currie, supra note 70, at 178: "If the court finds that the forum state has an interest
in the application of its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even though the
foreign state also has an interest in the application of its contrary policy, and, a fortiori,
it should apply the law of the forum if the foreign state has no such interest." Compare
Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH. L. R.Ev. 637, 644
(1960): "[P]ropositions as to a priori 'applicable' or 'governing' law, such as the lex loci
delicti or situs ••• should be preserved, but only where, and insofar as, they have sufficiently
crystallized in certain specific situations so as to be tenable as other exceptions from a
basic lex fori."
85 Cavers, Thomas M. Cooley Lecture No. 3, "Principles of Preference in Resolving
True Conflicts," delivered Jan. 24, 1964, at the University of Michigan Law School.

